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ABSTRACT 
 
We increasingly depend on algorithms to mediate information and thanks to the 
advance of computation power and big data, they do so more autonomously than ever 
before. At the same time, courts have been deferential to First Amendment defenses 
made in light of new technology. Computer code, algorithmic outputs, and arguably, the 
dissemination of data have all been determined as constituting “speech” entitled to 
constitutional protection. However, continuing to use the First Amendment as a barrier 
to regulation may have extreme consequences as our information ecosystem evolves. 
This paper focuses on developing a new approach to determining what should be 
considered “speech” if the First Amendment is to continue to protect the marketplace of 
ideas, individual autonomy, and democracy.  																					
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INTRODUCTION 
We depend on algorithms to make an increasing number of important decisions 
in our lives. We trust them to navigate our travels and answer our questions. Algorithms 
write1 and recommend the news we should consume, the books we read, and the friends 
we should get to know. In short, algorithms impact how individuals perceive the world-
online and off. And they do so more autonomously than ever before. 
 Back in the day (before 2015) most computer algorithms functioned by following 
a specific set of instructions manually coded by programmers. Today’s algorithms are 
different. Today’s algorithms teach themselves.2  Instead of relying on their 
programmer’s step-by-step coded instructions, algorithms now employ machine learning 
– a form of artificial intelligence that relies on neural networks and access to massive 
amounts of data. Algorithms are now “taught” to create their own code to address new 
challenges and questions.3 
 Whether we realize it or not, such advanced algorithms already power much of 
our online activity. Facebook utilizes machine learning to determine which stories and 
																																																								
1 Ross Miller, AP’s ‘robot journalists’ are writing their own stories now, THE VERGE (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://www.theverge.com/2015/1/29/7939067/ap-journalism-automation-robots-financial-reporting; 
Caitlin Dewey, Facebook has repeatedly trended fake news since firing its human editors, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2016/10/12/facebook-has-repeatedly-trended-fake-news-since-firing-its-human-editors.  
 
2 Jason Tanz, Soon we won’t program computers. We’ll train them like dogs, WIRED (May 17, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/05/the-end-of-code/ (“With machine learning, programmers don’t encode 
computers with instructions. They train them. If you want to teach a neural network to recognize a cat, for 
instance, you don’t tell it to look for whiskers, ears, fur, and eyes. You simply show it thousands and 
thousands of photos of cats, and eventually it works things out. If it keeps misclassifying foxes as cats, you 
don’t rewrite the code. You just keep coaching it”). 
 
3 For a more in-depth explanation of deep learning see Robert D. Hof, Deep Learning – With massive 
amounts of computational power, machines can now recognize objects and translate speech in real time. 
Artificial intelligence is finally getting smart, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (May 2014), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/513696/deep-learning/. 
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articles show up in News Feeds, Google Photos uses it to identify faces, Amazon’s 
Alexa, Apple’s new Siri, and Microsoft’s Cortana all depend on machine learning for 
advanced language processing and machine translation when providing answers and 
suggestions.4  Google even incorporated machine learning in its search engine in 2015, 
inching one step closer towards their goal of creating a “cybernetic friend that listens in 
on your phone conversations, reads your e-mail, and tracks your every move so it can 
tell you things you want to know even before you ask.”5 
It is becoming clear that these technologies are not simply a new medium 
through which we express ourselves. Old analogies to the days of paper and of the 
Internet as a “vast library”6 are outdated and no longer make sense. Rather, as such 
technologies challenge the traditional notions of what it means to speak and 
communicate, it is imperative that the First Amendment adapt.7 How exactly it should 
adapt is an easier question to ask than answer.  
By arguing that some aspect of their algorithm-mediated processes constitute 
speech, information intermediaries such as Google and Verizon, as well as data-miners, 
have frequently cited the First Amendment as a barrier to regulation.8  Courts that have 																																																								
4    Cade Metz, AI is Transforming Google Search. The Rest of the World Is Next, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/ai-is-changing-the-technology-behind-google-searches/; Maurice E. 
Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, The Subtle Ways Your Digital Assistant Might Manipulate You, WIRED (Nov. 
29, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/subtle-ways-digital-assistant-might-manipulate/.  
 
5 Hof, Supra note 3.			
6 See Reno v. ACLU 521 U.S. 844, 853(1997). Justice Stevens compared the Internet to both a “vast 
library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering 
goods and services.” 
 
7 Arguably there are calls for First Amendment doctrine to change every time a new technology enters the 
mainstream. However, as several scholars have pointed out, this time really is “different.” See, e.g., Tim 
Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013) 	
8 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (“Information is speech”), Search King, Inc. 
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addressed these First Amendment defenses to common-law and regulatory claims have 
struggled with the threshold question: When is something “speech” in such a manner 
that it triggers the First Amendment and its protections? So far, courts have been 
arguably deferential to such defenses as recent decisions have held that computer code, 
the transmission or possession of data, and algorithmic outputs in the form of search 
results should be considered speech.9   
There may be very real consequences to broadly applying First Amendment 
jurisprudence to new technologies. As the information ecosystem changes, 
intermediaries and their algorithms hold enormous power to shape how individuals 
receive information and perceive the world. This can have an impact on the values 
underlying the First Amendment, namely the marketplace of ideas, individual autonomy, 
and self-governance.10  However, as government regulations of speech are subject to 
strict scrutiny, intermediaries and their algorithms are left largely unchecked.11 In other 
words, as technology evolves, the threshold question of what exactly constitutes 
“speech” in the digital context will become paramount. With the continued expansion of 
																																																																																																																																																																			
v. Google Tech., Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (finding that 
Google PageRanks are entitled to “full” First Amendment protection); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that source code is speech under the First 
Amendment); see also Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d at 484-85 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Because computer source 
code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas about computer programming, we 
hold that it is protected by the First Amendment.”); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet 
Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Verizon made First Amendment arguments against the 
subpoena provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act). 
 
9 Id. 		
10 Wu, Supra note 7. See also Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2015). 	
11 Strict scrutiny is extremely difficult to satisfy. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may...regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order 
to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated 
interest.”).  
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what is considered protected, will the First Amendment ironically become its own worst 
enemy? What poses a greater threat to the values the First Amendment is supposed to 
protect, the lack of regulations or the regulations themselves?12 This thesis attempts to 
shed light on those questions, especially where new technological advancements, such as 
machine learning, are concerned.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this thesis is to analyze the current judicial approach to answering the 
threshold speech question in technological situations, examine the potential impacts of 
machine learning algorithms on First Amendment values, and propose a revised 
theoretical framework for courts to apply when faced with complex issues surrounding 
speech and increasingly autonomous technology. This requires investigation into several 
elements, including: 
 
RQ1: How do courts currently determine what constitutes “protected speech” in       
          technological situations?     
 
  RQ1a: What are the theoretical justifications for distinguishing protected  
speech from unprotected communication? 
 
 
RQ2:  Are there negative implications for the First Amendment and its     
underlying values created by algorithms?  
 
 
RQ3: How can courts create an approach that enhances First Amendment values  
          for determining what constitutes protected speech in cyberspace?  
 
  RQ3a: What new or revised approaches have scholars proposed to  
                                     determine what constitutes protected speech in cyberspace?  																																																								
12 See e.g., Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235 (2013), Tutt’s article also asks 
and attempts to answer these questions.	
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This thesis is necessarily interdisciplinary in its focus and commences in four 
parts. It begins by conducting a legal case analysis to determine how courts decide what 
constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes. It explores how the judiciary attempts 
to understand new technology and balances the values of free expression. Part two pulls 
from mass communication research and gives an overview of how algorithms have 
impacted the information ecosystem by changing how information is created, indexed, 
distributed, accessed, and consumed. It also details how algorithms have changed over 
time. Part three addresses the impact algorithms have on the values underlying the First 
Amendment and highlights the danger of continued deference to First Amendment 
defenses based on outdated analogies and assumptions about our information 
ecosystem.1314  Part four then concludes by proposing a new approach to the 
constitutional inquiry of “speech” by focusing on the identity of the speaker (algorithmic 
or human), and the functionality of the communication. It also takes a look at what types 
of regulations and accountability measures other scholars have called for. Striking the 
right constitutional balance is important: too little protection would be detrimental to 
speakers who no longer depend on pen and paper, but too much protection would 
																																																								
13 Some scholars have argued that the expansion of the First Amendment and its use as a deregulatory tool 
has hit Lochner-like proportions. See Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-
Generation Internet Law, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287 (2000); Shanor, Supra note 10.  
 
14 This thesis is only concerned with judicial opinions that push First Amendment protections into truly 
new territory such as computer code, algorithms and their outputs, and digital data collection. For 
example, the extension of the First Amendment to video games in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), is sometimes presented as a technology case, but it would have been more 
surprising if the Court found that video games did not receive similar protections to	the movies they 
resemble. See also Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of Information As Speech, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761 
(2016), Langvardt also considers these cases as currently pushing the boundaries. 	
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threaten to permit discrimination and invasions of personal privacy while actually 
undermining the values of the First Amendment.  
 
 
I. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND EXPANSION  
 
To be clear, the question of what exactly constitutes protected “speech” is not 
novel, courts have had to wrestle with such a determination whenever new technologies 
materialize. For example, in the early twentieth century, cases regarding various forms 
of entertainment (most prominently film) were causally dismissed.15 Commercial 
advertising was once considered to be beyond the scope of First Amendment protection 
until the 1976 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy decision.16 In 1997, the Supreme Court 
announced protections for the Internet17 and in 2011, video games.18  
This section will analyze the continued development of First Amendment 
jurisprudence in truly technological situations.19 It will focus on judicial opinions that 
have applied the First Amendment to the functional elements that necessarily form the 
digital realm as we know it– namely code, data, and automated outputs. It will 
demonstrate that although the decisions seem reasonable based on their respective facts, 
they often lack technological understanding and theoretical justification, together 
creating a broad and troubling precedent. 																																																								
15 Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. 
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).  
 
16 Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 758, 770 (1976) 
(holding that “commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected”). 
 
17 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
 
18 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011). 
 
19 Supra note 14. In addition, at least one federal court has held that blog posts and tweets are protected, 
but this question doesn’t necessarily push the First Amendment into new territory. See United States v. 
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp 2d 574, 577-78 (D. Md. 2011).  
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A. Computer Code 
Around the turn of the century considerable attention was paid to whether 
computer code was speech, such that regulations of code would trigger the 
heightened scrutiny required by the First Amendment. Litigation largely focused on 
regulations surrounding distribution. By regulating the circulation of the code itself, 
the U.S. government sought to limit the proliferation of computer programs it 
perceived as jeopardizing national security. The most influential and precedential 
cases regarding the issue of code-as-speech include Bernstein v. United States 
Department of Justice20, and Junger v. Daley21 – two cases dealing with national 
security-related export restrictions for cryptographic software. 
Bernstein was the first case to explicitly take on the question of whether 
computer code itself qualified as speech.22 Daniel Bernstein was a doctoral student at 
the University of California, Berkeley, when he sought to publish a paper and the 
associated source code of an encryption software program. “Source code” refers to 
the format in which programmers write software. Software called “compilers” are 
																																																								
20 Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (motion to dismiss); 945 F. Supp. 1279 
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (summary judgment); 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
21 Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 
22 See also Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996). Arguably, Karn was the first case to 
deal with the issue of computer code as speech, however the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia only addressed Karn’s First Amendment theories in hypothetical terms and dismissed the case 
on justiciability issues. 
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then used to convert this source code into “machine code” or “object code,” the 
string of ones and zeros that interfaces directly with the computer’s CPU.23 
Bernstein requested permission from the State Department under a procedure 
known as “commodity jurisdiction determination.” The point of the procedure was to 
determine whether the code was a defense article subject to certain export controls 
and licenses. The State Department responded that the source code was munition 
under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) and that Bernstein 
would in fact need to acquire a license to publish the paper and the source code.  
Bernstein ultimately challenged the constitutionality of the ITAR 
determination, arguing that the regulation infringed on his First Amendment rights. 
Bernstein’s initial step, however, was convincing the court that the First Amendment 
was implicated at all – in other words, that source code was actually a form of 
speech. The State Department asserted that the First Amendment did not apply. It 
argued that the code itself was a functioning product not intended to covey any 
particular message.24 The State Department cited the reasoning behind several U.S. 
Supreme Court cases that distinguished speech from unprotected conduct25 for the 
proposition that an act must be “sufficiently imbued with the elements of 
communication” to fall within the protections of the First Amendment. The State 
Department argued that although a written description of software (the paper, for 
example) informs the intellect and constitutes expression, source code on the other 
																																																								
23 See e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 1 (1994).	
24 Bernstein v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1286 (N.D. Cal. 1996).  
 
25 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
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hand is primarily functional – it is akin to a set of directions telling a computer what 
to do.  
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the 
State Department’s arguments, and reasoned that since the source code was written, 
it was speech entitled to protection. “There is little about this functional writing to 
suggest it is more like conduct than speech...defendants’ reliance on the conduct 
cases is misplaced,” wrote the court.26 The court went on to analogize that source 
code was similar to foreign languages. “Language is by definition speech and the 
regulation of any language is the regulation of speech...This court can find no 
meaningful difference between computer language, particularly high-level languages 
as defined above, and German or French. Even object code, which directly instructs 
the computer, operates as a ‘language,”27 the opinion concluded. The court 
categorically proclaimed computer code amounted to speech for First Amendment 
purposes and subsequently granted summary judgment to Bernstein on his First 
Amendment claims, holding the challenged ITAR regulations facially invalid as a 
prior restraint.28 
Similar to the plaintiff in Bernstein, Case Western University Law School 
professor Peter Junger challenged the Clinton Administration’s regulations regarding 
the export of encryption products after he had attempted to publish the source code 
																																																								
26 Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 
27 Id.  
 
28 Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1286 
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of an encryption program he had created.29 When the Commerce Department denied 
Junger’s application to publish the source code on the Internet without a special 
license Junger sued, asserting an infringement of his First Amendment rights.30 
The Sixth Circuit took the same approach as the trial court in Bernstein, and 
emphasized that source code acts as an expressive specialized language. “Much like 
a mathematical or scientific formula, one can describe the function and design of 
encryption software with a prose explanation; however, for individuals fluent in a 
computer programming language, source code is the most efficient and precise 
means by which to communicate ideas about cryptography... The Supreme Court has 
expressed the versatile scope of the First Amendment by labeling as ‘unquestionably 
shielded’ the artwork of Jackson Pollack, the music of Arnold Schoenberg, or the 
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll. Though unquestionably expressive, these things 
identified by the Court are not traditional speech. Particularly, a musical score cannot 
be read by the majority of the public but can be used as a means of communication 
among musicians. Likewise, computer source code, though unintelligible to many, is 
the preferred method of communication among computer programmers,” Judge 
Martin wrote for a unanimous panel.31 Taken together, Bernstein and Junger 
announced a broad categorical rule: source code is protected speech. Courts that have 
since examined the issue have been largely in agreement.3233 
																																																								
29  Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 482-83 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 
30 Id.			
31 Junger, 209 F.3d at 484. 
 
32 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 447-49 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Elcom 
Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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Nevertheless, scholars have questioned the courts’ conclusion since the only 
messages or ideas code communicates are messages about the code itself. As George 
Washington University Law School professor Orin Kerr emphasized in his article 
Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First Generation Internet Law, the 
problem with this logic is that everything is an expressive means for the exchange of 
information and ideas about itself.34 “Robbing a bank provides the most instructive 
way to teach someone how to rob a bank; kicking someone in the shins provides an 
excellent way of communicating the concept of kicking someone in the shins, but 
clearly these actions are functional conduct, not protected speech,” Kerr wrote.35  
In the physical world, courts recognize this paradox and the application of the 
First Amendment goes beyond what things are to what they actually say. For 
example, burning the American flag is protected expression, not because it 
communicates how to burn flags, but because it conveys a political message.36 
Donating money to a political campaign constitutes speech because it conveys an 
agreement with certain ideological viewpoints, not because it communicates a 
message about how to spend money.37 In these cases, the Supreme Court went 
																																																																																																																																																																			
33 One case has held to the contrary. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Vartuli, the program 
was to be operated “mechanically” and “without the intercession of the mind or the will of the recipient.” 
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held, “the fact that the system used words as triggers and a human 
being as a conduit, rather than programming commands as triggers and semiconductors as a conduit, 
appears to us to be irrelevant for purposes of this analysis.” This case has not been followed however. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Vartuli 228 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Andrew Tutt, The 
New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 297 (2014) 
34 Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-Generation Internet Law, 57 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1287, 1292 (2000). 
 
35 Id.  
 
36 Id. See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
 
37 Id. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976). 
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beyond what the actions actually were to what they communicated. As Kerr states, 
“regulation of source code presents the converse of these cases. Whereas flag-
burning involves meaningful expression without the [traditional] form of speech, 
source code provides the form of speech [writing] without meaningful expression.”38 
One could also take the “code is speech” rule as categorical in nature - 
emphasizing the judiciary’s desire to treat code as a medium, akin to newspapers, 
film, or video games. Although this method takes into account the functionality 
aspect, it fails to realize how cyberspace actually works. Everything on the Internet is 
code; code is the building block of cyberspace.39 Thus, categorically determining that 
code is speech sets up a difficult premise: that every series of computer instructions 
warrants First Amendment protection. This approach denies that the application of 
the First Amendment should be based on “the factual context and environment”40 
and instead holds that it is simply the presence of code itself that drives protection. 
Whereas the law of the physical world distinguishes carefully between different 
types of communications and ideas, the current approach fails to take into account 
context and applies equally to all code regardless of its contents or expressions.  
As a result, courts have struggled with how to apply the broad rule to other 
regulations regarding the circulation of code, such as the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) and its digital rights management (DRM) measures. DRM 
operates by “locking” a media file or storage medium so that it can only be copied a 
																																																								
38 Kerr Supra note 34 at 1292.  	
39 Id.  
 
40 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974). 
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number of times.41 For example, early versions of music files on iTunes could only 
be copied to a maximum of five devices thus limiting circulation.42 Parties who 
developed methods for cracking DRM software, and who then posted the source 
code online, invoked Bernstein and Junger and challenged the DMCA on First 
Amendment grounds. Although the courts that dealt with the issue agreed that the 
First Amendment was necessarily implicated as source code was involved, they 
nonetheless held that the DMCA’s anti-circumvention rules were content-neutral and 
therefore only applied intermediate, rather than strict scrutiny.43 After these cases, 
some scholars have argued that code constitutes a limited category of speech similar 
to the protections awarded to commercial speech.44  
Current litigation addresses the code as speech rule within a more recent 
innovation –3D printing. In May 2013, the plaintiff, Defense Distributed, designed 
and posted on its website the computer-aided design (CAD) files needed to print “the 
Liberator,” the first fully printable handgun.45 The State Department demanded 
Defense Distributed remove the Liberator and other weapons-related files from its 
website. Defense Distributed now argues such an action constitutes a prior restraint 																																																								
41 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) § 103, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)Panel II: Licensing in the 
Digital Age: The Future of Digital Rights Management, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 1009, 1086 (2005). 
 
42 Id.  
 
43 See, Universal City Studios Inc., v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d, 294 at 326 (S.D.N.Y 2000) (striking, 
via a content-neutrality argument, a DMCA provision against trafficking in DRM circumvention 
technologies); Sony Computer Entm’t Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing that object code may be copyrighted as expression under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); see also 
United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 
44 See Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of Information As Speech, 47 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 761 (2016)  
 
45Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 1:15-CV-372 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2015) CAD files are largely 
made up of code and drafting information for a 3D printer / computer.  
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exercised on a content-discriminatory basis against “speech about guns,” and cites 
Bernstein and Junger for the rule that source code is protected speech.46 A decision 
had not yet been made on the merits at the time of the completion of this thesis; 
however this case and the cases addressing the DMCA highlight the trouble such a 
broad code-as-speech precedent yields, especially as more of society’s activities rely 
on code dependant technologies, either written by human programmers or 
autonomously. 
 
B. Algorithmic Outputs    
Just as algorithmic decision-making has become more sophisticated with machine 
learning, so has the expression of its results. Consider the following examples of 
algorithmic outputs that function in arguably expressive ways:  Amazon’s Alexa 
orally answers a question about the history of democracy, Spotify supplies daily 
playlists to its users, The New York Times uses an automated algorithm to write a 
sports article.47 Such automated decisions are a key feature of our information 
ecosystem.48  However, “that we are now turning to algorithms to identify what we 
need to know is as momentous as having relied on credentialed experts, the scientific 
																																																								
46See e.g., Defense Distributed v. U.S. Department of State, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG, 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/about-josh/defense-distributed-v-u-s-department-of-state/ (last visited Mar. 
9, 2016). 		
47 Tim Adams, And the Pulitzer goes to...a computer, THE GUARDIAN, June 28, 2015, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/28/computer-writing-journalism-artificial-intelligence; 
Shelley Podolny, If An Algorithm Wrote This, How Would You Even Know?, The NEW YORK TIMES, 
March 7 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/opinion/sunday/if-an-algorithm-wrote-
this-how-would-you-even-know.html. 
 
48 See C.W. Anderson, Deliberative, agonistic, and algorithmic audiences: Journalism’s vison of its public 
in an age of audience, JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 5: 529-547 (2011) 
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method, common sense, or the word of God,” writes Cornell University professor 
Tarleton Gillespie.49 
The focus here is not on whether the code of an algorithm is protected (which 
would most likely be the case under Bernstein and Junger above), but whether the 
outputs of that code – the automated decisions created by algorithms – are speech. 
For example, the question whether the First Amendment applies to regulation of 
search engine results is different from the question whether the actual algorithms 
used by those search engines is speech.50 
So, when are algorithmic outputs considered speech for First Amendment 
purposes? The answer is a lawyerly “it depends,” as there is limited case law on the 
topic. The opinions that have emerged are primarily in the area of search results.51 
Two federal court decisions have held that search results, including the choice of 
what to include in those results and how they are ranked, constitute speech fully 
protected by the First Amendment.52 
																																																								
49 Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, Media Technologies, MIT PRESS (2015) available at 
http://mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.7551/mitpress/9780262525374.001.0001/upso-
9780262525374-chapter-9.  
50 Stuart Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1445, 1449 (2013). 	
51 One case has found that software that informs users that they have malware on their computer “is a form 
of speech” analogous to the expression of an opinion; See New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 
1071, 1081-83 (C.D. Cal. 2003). In Rosenberg v. Harwood, Google raised a First Amendment defense 
when a woman claimed that by relying on Google Maps’ walking directions, she stepped onto a freeway 
and was hit by a car; Rosen v. Harwood, No. 100916536, 2011 WL 3153314 (D. Utah May 27, 2011). 
 
52 See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007) (“The First Amendment 
guarantees an individual the right to free speech, ‘a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what 
to say and what not to say....’ [T]he injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff contravenes Defendants’ First 
Amendment rights.”); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, 
at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (Google’s ranking decisions are “constitutionally protected opinions” 
that are “entitled to full constitutional protection.”). 
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The most prominent case discussing a search engine’s First Amendment rights is  
Search King, Inc. v. Google.53 Search King was a search optimization firm that 
promised to elevate its clients’ rankings in a Google search. When Google caught 
wind of the business, the search engine actively demoted Search King’s clients. 
Search King sued Google for tortious interference with contract.54 Google raised a 
First Amendment defense and the court agreed, refusing to grant Search King a 
preliminary injunction.55 Google argued that although it uses sophisticated 
computerized algorithms, those algorithms “inherently incorporate the search engine 
company engineers’ judgments about what material users are likely to find 
responsive to these queries.”56 
In agreement with Google, the court determined that the search results consisted 
of some form of  “opinion.”  “PageRanks are opinions- opinions of the significance 
of particular web sites as they correspond to a search query...Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that Google’s PageRanks are entitled to full constitutional protection,” the 
court concluded.57 Similarly, in St. Louis Martin v. Google, the Superior Court of the 
State of California for San Francisco also agreed with Google’s arguments that its 
																																																								
53 Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 
2003). 
 
54 Id.  
 
55 Id.  
 
56 Id.  
 
57 Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at 4. 
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search result order and ad placement options were constitutionally protected 
opinions.58  
To fortify their stance on the matter, in 2012, Google commissioned a white paper 
by prominent UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh and class action attorney Donald 
Falk in which the pair concluded that Google is akin to a modern day newspaper 
editor.59 Just as a newspaper selects the most important stories of the day and 
presents them on the front page, Google’s search engineers similarly codes the 
algorithm how to rank the world’s web pages with respect to their relevance to 
various criteria and hence, according to Volokh and Falk, gain the same 
protections.60 
These decisions have led to a vast amount of scholarship in the area of whether 
algorithmic outputs should be considered speech. Several have argued the rulings do 
not take into account the power intermediaries such as Google and their algorithms 
have on influencing individual dispositions and attitudes. Law professors Oren 
Bracha and Frank Pasquale have described search engines as the “bottlenecks of the 
																																																								
58 S. Louis Martin v. Google, Inc., No. CGC-14-539972, Superior Court of California County of San 
Francisco (2014) available at 
https://www.manatt.com/uploadedFiles/Content/4_News_and_Events/Newsletters/AdvertisingLaw@mana
tt/Martinv.Google.pdf ; See also Megan Geuss, Court agrees that Google’s search results qualify as free 
speech, ARS TECHNICA (Nov.17, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/11/court-agrees-that-
googles-search-results-qualify-as-free-speech/.  
 
59 Eugene Volokh & Donald Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, 6-7 
(2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf (arguing that the First Amendment protects 
Google’s search results);See also Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at 4. This approach derives from 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). Stuart Benjamin relies on a similar standard in 
Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1445 (2013) discussed below.  
 
60 Volokh and Falk Id.  	
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information infrastructure” that “exercise extraordinary control over data flow.”61 
Constitutional protections for these new gatekeepers gives rise to concerns about 
access to information and individual autonomy. 
How these rulings will be interpreted in light of machine learning and the rise of 
AI is yet to be determined, but the standard that algorithms are capable of expressing 
an opinion could include a great deal within its purview. The question of whether 
courts have gone too far will become more salient as individuals grow to rely on 
algorithmic decision-making. 
 
C. Data  
Perhaps the broadest vision of what exactly constitutes protected speech was put 
forth by the Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.62  “The creation and 
dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First 
Amendment,” wrote Justice Kennedy for the 6-3 majority.63 In Sorrell, data miners 
and pharmaceutical manufacturers successfully challenged the constitutionality of a 
Vermont statute prohibiting the “sale, license or exchange for value” of pharmacy 
records to marketers for the use of promotion and advertising of prescription drugs.64 
Vermont’s Act 80 was accompanied by legislative findings that showed concern 
over data-mining and biased medical information. Vermont found, for example, that 
the “goals of marketing programs are often in conflict with the goals of the state” and 																																																								
61 Id.  
 
62 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011). 
 
63 Id.  
 
64 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.  
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that the “marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effectiveness is frequently 
one-sided in that brand-name companies invest in expensive pharmaceutical 
marketing campaigns to doctors.”65 Detailing, in the legislature’s view, caused 
doctors to make decisions based on “incomplete and biased information.” Because 
they “are unable to take the time to research the quickly changing pharmaceutical 
market,” Vermont doctors “rely on information provided by pharmaceutical 
representatives.”66 The data mining companies argued that such a statute infringed 
their rights to speech and access to information. The State contended that the First 
Amendment did not apply and argued that the law was merely a commercial 
regulation, not a regulation of speech.67  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the law 
violated the First Amendment by burdening the speech of pharmaceutical marketers 
and data miners without an adequate justification.68 The decision of the Second 
Circuit was in conflict with earlier decisions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit concerning similar legislation enacted by Maine and New 
Hampshire.69 The First Circuit characterized the collected information as a mere 
“commodity” with no greater entitlement to First Amendment protection than “beef 
																																																								
65 Act of General Assembly Vermont, S. 115 (2007) available at 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2008/acts/ACT080.HTM 
 
66 Id. 	
67 IMS Health Inc., v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Vt. 2009) 
 
68 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 630 F.3d 263 (2nd Cir. 2010).  
 
69 IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F. 3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (Maine); IMS Health Inc., v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42  
(1st Cir. 2008) (New Hampshire). 
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jerky.”70 Recognizing the circuit split, the Court granted certiorari in 2010. Sorrell 
was the first, and so far the only, Supreme Court decision addressing the use of data 
mining in the First Amendment context. 
Emphatically rejecting the State’s arguments the Court held, “speech in aid of 
pharmaceutical marketing...is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment. As a consequence, Vermont’s statute must be 
subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny. The law cannot satisfy that standard.”71 
Although many amicus briefs (over 40 filed72) highlighted the increasingly 
technological matters of data collection and information gathering, the decision 
lacked any discussion the impact such a rule could have on the increasing use of 
data.73  Rather, the Court focused on traditional commercial speech aspects instead 
of concerns about privacy, information manipulation, and individual autonomy.74 As 
the Court emphasized throughout the opinion, the Vermont law only prohibited the 
sale of data for promotional purposes. The Court took this as a specific content and 																																																								
70 Ayotte, 550 F. 3d, at 52–53.  
 
71 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 
72 See generally, BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 
(EPIC) IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE AND URGING AFFIRMANCE, No. 09 – 1913 (2009), available 
at https://epic.org/privacy/ims_sorrell/epic_amicus.pdf; BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE BLOOMBERG L.P., 
THE MCGRAW-HILL COMPANIES, INC., HEARST CORPORATION, PROPUBLICA, THE 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE 
TEXAS TRIBUNE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS, No. 10 – 779 (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/Other_Brief_Updates/10-
779_respondentamcu7newsmediagrps.authcheckdam.pdf;  
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONERS, No. 10 – 779 (2011), available at  
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/10-779-tsac-Electronic-Frontier-
Foundation.pdf.  
 
73 Sorrell, 131. S. Ct. at 2669.  
 
74 Much scholarship has been written about the meaning of the Sorrell decision about the future of the 
commercial speech doctrine, however that is not the focus of this thesis and will not be addressed here.   
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speaker based restriction on the face of the law and sidestepped the technological 
nuances.75 “The capacity of technology to find and publish personal information, 
including records required by the government, presents serious and unresolved issues 
with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure. In considering 
how to protect those interests, however, the State cannot engage in content-based 
discrimination to advance its own side of a debate,” states the opinion.         
Although some privacy scholars and organizations warn that the rule will be 
catastrophic to privacy regulations by requiring strict scrutiny,76 others took comfort 
that the court did not explicitly reference data mining and felt the decision would be 
limited in its scope.77 University of Minnesota Law School privacy law professor 
William McGeveran wrote, “The Court determined, quite rightly, that the state just 
doesn’t like what the pharmaceutical representatives say and wants to silence 
them...I think [the decision] preserves the core privacy issues for another day.”78 
On the other hand, many have agreed with the dissenting Justices that the 
information-as-speech rule that emerges is dangerously broad and could lead to a 
																																																								
75 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660 – 2672. 
 
76 For the potential impacts on privacy: See e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, 
Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 855-56 (2012); Neil M. Richards, Reconciling 
Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1173 (2005); Jane Bambauer, Is Data 
Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014).  
 
77 Jane Yakowitz, Information is Not Beef Jerky, Info/Law Blog, available at 
http://blogs.harvard.edu/infolaw/2011/06/23/information-is-not-beef-jerky/; Agatha M. Cole, Internet 
Advertising After Sorrell v. IMS Health: A Discussion on Data Privacy & the First Amendment, 30 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 307 (2012).  
 
78 William McGeveran, Supreme Court RX Records Case: Not So Bad, INFO LAW BLOG, 
http://blogs.harvard.edu/infolaw/2011/06/23/sorell-ims-decision/. 
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Pandora’s Box of  deregulatory challenges.79 Justice Stephen Breyer joined by 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan, argued in his dissent that the Court’s holding 
protects information at too high a level of generality and could have consequences 
for many areas of law.  “To apply a strict First Amendment standard virtually as a 
matter of course when a court reviews ordinary economic regulatory programs (even 
if that program has a modest impact upon a firm’s ability to shape a commercial 
message) would work at cross-purposes with this more basic constitutional approach. 
Since ordinary regulatory programs can affect speech, particularly commercial 
speech, in myriad ways, to apply a “heightened” First Amendment standard of 
review whenever such a program burdens speech would transfer from legislatures to 
judges the primary power to weigh ends and to choose means, threatening to distort 
or undermine legitimate legislative objectives,” Justice Breyer wrote. 80  After the 
Sorrell decision, many plaintiffs have used the First Amendment to challenge 
commercial regulations in matters ranging from public health to data privacy. “It is 
no exaggeration to observe that the First Amendment has become a power engine of 
Constitutional deregulation,” wrote Yale Law School Dean Robert Post.81  
Even if Sorrell may appear unrelated to the question of what counts as speech in 
the digital realm, Google has frequently cited the case for a First Amendment 
																																																								
79 Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech or Resurrecting Lochner?, CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 129 (2011), Robert Post and Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 
165, 167 (2015); Tim Wu Machine Speech, supra note 8, at 1496, 1498, 1508 (“At some point a broad 
theory of speech would encounter the anticanonical influence of Lochner v. New York, or the prescription 
that the federal judiciary should not strike economic legislation based on its policy preferences.”  
80 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673-77, 2680-81 (Breyer, J., Dissenting).  
 
81 Post, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, Supra note 79 at 16. 
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defense to anticompetitive claims regarding search rankings.82 “As the Supreme 
Court has held, ‘information is speech,” attorneys Eugene Volokh and Donald Falk 
argued in a 2012 white paper. 	“Search engine results are in reality not simply facts: 
They are collections of facts that are organized and sorted using the judgment 
embodied in the engines’ algorithms, and those judgments and algorithms represent 
the search engine companies’ opinions about what should be presented to users,” the 
paper asserts.  
By utilizing broad language and ignoring the impact such reasoning could have 
when applied to cyberspace, the Sorrell decision further muddies the waters when it 
comes to speech in the digital age. With the economy becoming more reliant on 
information computation, some scholars have argued that the case signals a shift 
away from First Amendment protection for information as expression and toward 
protection for information as competitive advantage.83 This shift could have large 
consequences the more technologies rely on data and information to target 
consumers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
82 Volokh and Falk Supra note 59; Noam Cohen, Professor Makes the Case that Google Is a Publisher, 
NEW YORK TIMES (May 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/business/media/eugene-volokh-
ucla-professor-makes-a-case-for-google-as-publisher.html.  83	Julie Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119, 1133 (2015). 
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Taken together, these recent decisions regarding code, algorithmic outputs and data 
represent the judiciary’s current method (or rather, the lack there of) for determining the 
threshold speech question in technological situations. To briefly recap the rules and 
reasoning here:  
Code: Courts have found that code is protected speech and triggers heightened 
scrutiny based on a theory that code is akin to a written language. 
 
Algorithmic Outputs: Courts have found that algorithmic outputs constitute 
speech and trigger heightened scrutiny based on a theory that they convey an “opinion.” 
 
Data: “The creation and dissemination of information are speech within the 
meaning of the First Amendment,” wrote Justice Kennedy, seemingly based upon a 
theory against signaling out access to information for certain speakers.  
 
Over a decade ago, Dean of Yale Law School Robert Post remarked “First 
Amendment coverage is triggered by those forms of social interaction that realize First 
Amendment values.” He went on to comment that “digital media, like the Internet, are so 
new and have such labile patterns of social interaction that it seems to me enormously 
difficult to acquire reliable normative or descriptive traction on the relevant questions – 
it will thus be necessary to pursue this line of inquiry.84 However, as others have 
critiqued, rather than fully take into account the context of how the digital realm 
operates, courts have continued to analogize to the past while making broad formulaic 																																																								
84 Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 716 
(2000). 
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rules about the individual elements that create cyberspace.85 The decisions here also lack 
any discussion on the potential impact of First Amendment values. Nor do they 
highlight, as one scholar puts it, “what makes speech special.”86 As several have pointed 
out, the lack of deliberation and policy concern has similarities to the Lochner era of 
labor regulations.87 Such an inclusive approach to speech may lead the First Amendment 
on a “tech bubble”88 heading for a burst in the near future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
85 See e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-Generation Internet Law, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1291 (2000); Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 
297 (2014); Josh Blackman, What Happens if Data is Speech?, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. HEIGHTENED 
SCRUTINY 25, 36 (2014).  
 
86 Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 297 (2014). 
 
87 See Cohen supra note 83; Langvardt supra note 44. 
 
88 Langvardt Supra note 44 at 809. 	
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II. THINKING CRITICALLY ABOUT ALGORITHMS AND MACHINE LEARNING  
 
Understanding algorithms and their impact on the information ecosystem is 
necessary if the First Amendment is to avoid such a bubble and continue to protect the 
values that we hold as a nation: the marketplace of ideas, and individual autonomy/self-
governance. This section begins with historical overview of the term “algorithm” and 
how the concept and technology has advanced. It then reviews mass communication 
research in this area to spotlight how our information ecosystem has changed.  
 
A. History 
The word “algorithm” has become a household term in recent years, due to an 
explosion of academic study and media focus.89 Yet, while the term “algorithm” is 
commonly understood as a set of defined steps to produce a particular solution, this 
is somewhat an oversimplification.90 The cultural conception of algorithms tends to 
conflate the full spectrum- from static mathematical procedures to advanced 
automated learning and reasoning methods. In addition, algorithms can be 
contemplated in a number of ways: technically, mathematically, politically, 
culturally, ethically, and so forth. The truth is algorithms have evolved over 
centuries, come in many forms, and can be studied in a myriad of ways, one of the 
reasons why many scholars find their study difficult.91   
																																																								
89 David Beer, The social power of algorithms, 20 INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY, 1, 1-13 
(2017).  
 
90 Id.  
 
91 Id. As David Beer writes “perhaps the biggest single issue we have to consider when attempting to 
research the social power of algorithms is the potential difficulty of fully appreciating the object of study.”  
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The term “algorithm” has been traced back to twelfth-century mathematician 
Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi, whose texts described reliable step-by-step 
procedures for finding solutions to equations.92 In the mid-twentieth century, Alonzo 
Church and Alan Turing, among other scholars, incorporated algorithms into code 
allowing for scientific computation.93 Algorithms are often understood as being the 
“decision-making” elements of code.94 For example, computer programs structure 
layers of algorithms together creating decision trees that when compiled will perform 
the task or solve the problem.    
However, over the past few years, and especially since 2015, a new type of 
algorithm has emerged - one that utilizes concepts from the field of artificial 
intelligence. Also during the mid-twentieth century, AI pioneers, including John 
McCarthy, Frank Rosenblatt, and Marvin Minsky, dreamed of empowering 
computing systems with the gift of intelligence or the ability to learn from 
experience.95 However, it was not until recently with the one-two punch of an 
explosion in computational power and the big data revolution that their dreams of 
machine learning could be realized.  
Machine learning at its most basic level is the practice of using algorithms to 
parse data, learn from it, and then make a determination or prediction. Rather than 
hand-coding software routines with a specific set of instructions, the program is 																																																								
92  Osonde Osoba and William Welser IV, An Intelligence in Our Image: The Risks of Bias and Errors in 
Artificial Intelligence, Rand Corporation (2017), available at www.rand.org/t/RR1744   
 
93 Michael Copeland, What’s the difference between artificial intelligence, machine learning, and deep 
learning?, NVIDIA Blog, (July 29, 2016),  available at	https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2016/07/29/whats-
difference-artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-deep-learning-ai/	
94 Beer Supra note 89 at 3. 
 
95 Osoba and Welser Supra note 92 at 3. 
 
	 28	
“trained” using large amounts of data and code that give it the ability to learn how to 
perform the task.96 Big data provides the steady stream of information necessary for 
extracting valuable insight.97 As algorithms are fed more data, the more they are able 
to learn and the more precise they become or so the theory goes. The code has been 
programmed to evolve, re-writing its algorithms as it observes, experiments, and 
learns independently of its creators.98  
This technology is what made Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo victorious against 
South Korean Master Lee Se-Dol in the board game Go in 2016.99 It is also 
employed in Google’s search engine, Facebook’s facial recognition function, and 
digital assistants such as Amazon’s Echo and Alphabet’s Home.100 In short, these 
modern algorithms are no longer fixed in form, but are emergent and constantly 
unfolding and updating in multifarious ways. They are reactive to input, interaction, 
and situation and they adjudicate more and more decisions in daily life. This has lead 
																																																								
96 Id.  
 
97 This stream will only grow as objects become more networked into the Internet of things to produce 
more data.  See Samuel Woolley and Philip Howard, Political Communication, Computational 
Propaganda, and Autonomous Agents, 10 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, 4882-
4890(2016).	
98 Rob Kitchin, Thinking critically about and researching algorithms, 20 INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION 
& SOCIETY 1, 14-29 (2017). 
 
99 Stephen Borowiec, AlphaGo seals 4-1 victory over Go grandmaster Lee Sedol, THE GUARDIAN (March 
15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/15/googles-alphago-seals-4-1-victory-over-
grandmaster-lee-sedol 
 
100  Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, The subtle ways your digital assistant might manipulate you, 
WIRED (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/subtle-ways-digital-assistant-might-
manipulate/.  
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several scholars to declare that algorithms, driven by vast troves of data, are the new 
“power brokers” in society.101 
Although most individuals attribute an aura of objectivity and infallibility to 
computerized decisions (in no small part due to technology companies’ presentation 
of algorithms as purely formal and neutral beings of reason)102 critical scholars argue 
that algorithms possess none of these qualities except as carefully crafted fictions.103 
Rather, algorithms are embedded and shaped by significant social, political, and 
infrastructure decisions.104 Furthermore, as communication scholar Rob Kitchin 
noted, “algorithms are created for purposes that are often far from neutral: to create 
value and capital; to nudge behavior and structure preferences in a certain way; and 
to identify, sort and classify people.”105  
Although algorithms are deployed in numerous industries from security to 
financial to medical, the focus here will be on how code, and its algorithms, have 
disrupted the information ecosystem as we knew it. By mediating how news is 
produced, distributed, and consumed, algorithms increasingly have a vast impact on 
informing and shaping individual choice. The implications of this revolution are 
significant on the values attributed to free expression, such as the marketplace of 																																																								
101 Nicholas Diakopoulos, Algorithmic Accountability, 3:3 DIGITAL JOURNALISM, 398-415 (2015); See 
also, FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND 
INFORMATION (1st ed. 2015). 
 
102 Matthew Fuller, Software studies – A lexicon, 15–20 (1st ed. 2008); See also Danielle Citron, 
Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1249, 313 (2007). 
 
103 Tarleton Gillespie, The	relevance	of	algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON 
COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 178, 192 (Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo Boczkowski, and K.A. 
Foot, eds., 2014) 
 
104 See e.g., Frank Pasquale, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU (1st ed. 
2011).  
 
105 Kitchin, Supra note 98 at 18.		
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ideas, individual autonomy, and an informed electorate. Understanding their impact 
on such values is therefore vital for the survival of the First Amendment and our 
democracy.  
 
B. Algorithms and Information  
Perhaps the most ironic consequence of the advance of the “information 
superhighway” has been the devaluation of legacy news organizations.106 Instead of 
newspapers or their website homepages, platforms like Facebook, Apple News, Google, 
and Twitter are increasingly the places individuals rely on to find information about their 
neighborhoods, nation, and world.107 According to a recent study by the Pew Research 
Center, four out of ten adults in the United States get their news primarily from 
Facebook.108 That number is likely to grow as nearly half of readers below the age of 35 
consider Facebook and Twitter to be either an important or the most important way they 
get news and information.109  “The idea that the press was held in the venerable houses 
of The New York Times, The Washington Post, the Financial Times, The Guardian has 
really changed,” said Kate Crawford, a principal researcher at Microsoft Research and a 
																																																								
106 Meant to be those organizations that predate the Internet and hire journalists who adhere to core 
journalistic ethics. This includes the New York Times, and The Washington Post.  
 
107 See e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA, 28 (2016), available at 
http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/state-of-the-news-media/2016/.  Highlighting the complexity of what 
is happening to the news industry by the numbers.  
 
108 PEW RESEARCH CTR., NEWS USE ACROSS SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS (2016), 
http://www.journalism.org/files/2016/05/PJ_2016.05.26_social-media-and-news_FINAL-1.pdf. 
(showing that the percentage of Facebook users who get news on the site rose from 47 to 66 percent 
between 2013 and 2016, for Twitter from 52 to 59 percent and for Instagram from 13 to 23 percent); See 
also PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE EVOLVING ROLE OF NEWS ON TWITTER AND FACEBOOK 
13 (2015), http://www.journalism.org/files/2015/07/Twitter-and-News-Survey-Report-FINAL2.pdf. 
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visiting professor at MIT’s Center for Civil Media. “Today we see players like Snapchat, 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, playing extraordinarily powerful roles in the 
dissemination and understanding of information in the world.”110 
The role of information gatekeeper is not just shifting to other news sources, but 
is being delegated to algorithms. Algorithms determine what information reaches 
individuals and unlike journalists who follow a code of objectivity and accuracy, 
algorithms and their owners are primarily concerned with relevance – the goal being to 
discern exactly what users want to read and to give just that.111 As one scholar has 
described it, competing forms of logic undergird journalism and algorithms. “[E]ditorial 
logic,” says Tarleton Gillespie, “depends on the subjective choices of experts, 
themselves made and authorized through institutional processes of training and 
certification, or validated by the public through the mechanisms of the market.”112  In 
contrast, “algorithmic logic . . . depends on the proceduralized choices of a machine, 
designed by human operators to automate some proxy of human judgment or unearth 
patterns across collected social traces.” 
This focus on relevance has led to what journalist and media scholar Eli Pariser 
coined the “filter bubble.”113 Filtering involves including or excluding information 
according to various rules or criteria. In news personalization, platforms filter news 
according to how that news has been categorized and associated to the user’s interests, 																																																								
110 Journalism + Silicon Valley Conference, YOUTUBE (Nov. 13, 2015), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Qftw6VkDKQ (at 52:30).  
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and Journalism, “they define the conditions under which news is created and circulated.”  
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prioritized for that person. As Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg states, Facebook’s 
hope is to build the “perfect personalized newspaper” for every person in the world. 114 
However, filtering decisions can either over-emphasize or censor certain 
information by exposing individuals to news that they already agree with, thereby 
amplifying biases and hampering people’s development of diverse and healthy 
perspectives.115 “Our media is becoming a perfect reflection of our interests and desires” 
Pariser writes.116 
To see an example of the impact such a bubble could have, The Wall Street 
Journal created a tool called “Blue Feed, Red Feed.”117  Users could click on a variety of 
changing topics, which included terms like “ISIS,” “Donald Trump,” and “Abortion,” to 
see how, according to the newspaper, “reality may differ for different Facebook users” 
depending on their politics.118  The creator of the project, Jon Keenan, noted the 
difficulty of trying to escape the effect of the algorithm. “If you wanted to widen your 
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perspective and see things from a broad range of backgrounds, you would have to go and 
like the pages yourself,” he said. “Facebook’s product makes it hard to do this.”119  
And it’s not just social media platforms that deliver and filter information. Search 
engine providers often return a different list of results tailored to the individual user, thus 
further contributing to the “bubble.”120 This has prompted scholars to contend that rather 
then treating a search engine as a neutral conduit objectively delivering results, search 
engines act more like advisors to the user by being responsive to the query and 
suggesting which results it deems most relevant based on knowledge about the asker.121 
In addition to mediating how news is recommended and consumed, algorithms 
have also impacted how it’s created. Gone are the days of dramatic “Page One” meetings 
between journalists and their editors.122 Enter coders, engineers, and data points. 
“Precisely because information algorithms make judgments that can have powerful 
consequences, those interested in having their information selected as relevant will tend 
to orient themselves toward these algorithmic systems to make themselves 
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algorithmically recognizable in the hopes of being amplified by them,” writes 
Gillespie.123  
In search of the audience and the revenue that they once enjoyed, legacy news 
organizations are now reliant on being “picked up” or recognized by algorithms, which 
has meant that platforms and search engines are now able to exert control over the 
creation of content in news rooms. “The Times is now publishing articles it never would 
have touched before in order to stay part of a conversation that’s taking place on social 
media and read on smartphones,” Margaret Sullivan, the former public editor of The 
New York Times, wrote in her final column for the paper.124 Facebook “dictates how 
resources are spent and what stories are told,” journalist Julia Greenberg wrote in Wired. 
This is “[n]ot in a sort of theoretical, hey-this-could-happen-someday kind of way, but a 
real, look-it’s-happening-all-around-us-already way. Facebook is setting the rules, and 
news organizations are following.”125 Any public change in an algorithm often sets off a 
new round of strategizing by traditional media companies.126 
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In addition, algorithms are frequently becoming the content creators themselves. 
Outlets such as the Associated Press and Los Angeles Times are pioneers in “robot 
journalism” or “automated journalism” in which algorithms actually write stories.127 The 
Associated Press announced in 2015 that it was automatically generating more than 
3,000 stories per quarter about corporate earnings.128 The Los Angeles Times created 
“Quakebot,” which utilizes data from the U.S. Geological Survey’s Earthquake 
Notification System to automatically generate stories about earthquakes.129 However, in 
several instances the newspaper published algorithmically authored stories based on 
faulty data about earthquakes that never occurred.130 
 In another example, on August 26, 2017, Facebook announced that its human 
editors would no longer write descriptions for its Trending topics nor vet the Trending 
topics for accuracy. That job was given over to the company’s algorithms. However, 
three days after removing the human eye, Facebook’s algorithm chose a factually 
incorrect headline regarding Megyn Kelly.131 The headline claimed the Fox News 
channel had “Kicked her out for backing Hillary.”132 It had not. Over two weeks, The 
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Washington Post uncovered five trending completely false news stories, and three that 
were profoundly inaccurate.133 Needless to say, since Facebook’s Trending feature is 
supposed to serve as a snapshot of the day’s most important and most-discussed news 
curetted for the individual user, the fact that it was repeatedly spreading misinformation 
is concerning to say the least.134  
 Regarding search, media scholars Latanya Sweeney and Nick Diakopoulous 
highlighted instances of “algorithmic defamation by association” in Google searches and 
ads. Diakopoulos discussed examples where Google auto-completion routines often 
made defamatory or bigoted associations about people or groups of people related to 
transgender issues.135 Such algorithmic associations raise ethical concerns to the extent 
that they signal certainty, discourage alternative explorations, and create coherence 
among disparate objects.136 
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 In addition, political “bots” or algorithms written to learn from and mimic real 
people on social media are becoming a regular tool for lobbyists, activists, and political 
campaigns to spread information or “computational propaganda.”137 Computational 
propaganda is the “assemblage of social media platforms, autonomous agents, and big 
data tasked with the manipulation of public opinion.”138 Although computer scientists 
and policy makers often treat bots as a nuisance to be managed, others argue that they 
have significant social impact and are becoming more sophisticated with advancements 
in technology and data mining.139 “Altogether, social media, political bots, and the 
Internet of things enable computational propaganda. Autonomous agents, equipped with 
big data about our behavior collected from the Internet of things, work over social media 
to engage with us on political issues and advance ideological projects,” cautioned media 
scholar Samuel Woolley and University of Oxford professor Philip Howard.140  
 As the examples above show, algorithms mediate information and influence our 
lives in a number of ways. In addition, thanks to advances in technology, the shape and 
character of digital communications are shifting again and newspaper homepages are no 
longer the primary means by which most people encounter information. It is important 
for courts to understand the impact and take it into account as our society evolves in the 
information age.  
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III. PUTTING IT TOGETHER – ALGORITHMS, MACHINE LEARNING, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT  
 
As stated above, algorithms do not adhere to any type of ethical code. They 
cannot intuitively vet material for truth. They are neither accountable nor transparent in 
their decisions to select, prioritize, and recommend information.141 Yet, individuals are 
increasingly looking towards algorithmically mediated platforms for their information 
and news.  
At the same time, the legal case analysis above illustrates how the court’s current 
approach to awarding First Amendment protection fails in two main areas. First, judges 
often have insufficient comprehension of how the technological elements of code, data, 
and algorithms function together to give rise to a new information ecosystem. Second, 
there is a lack of understanding and discussion of how expanding speech protections to 
new technologies may actually hinder the values the First Amendment is assumed to 
safeguard as we become to rely on algorithmically mediated information. Both will 
addressed here.  
 
A. Theory  
Much ink has been spilled debating the philosophical theories underlying the 
First Amendment and the values it is supposed to protect, the most prominent being the 
marketplace of ideas, individual autonomy, and democracy. 142 However, considerably 																																																								
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less ink has been devoted to how algorithms, especially those that employ machine-
learning, may challenge these values as the information ecosystem changes. This section 
strives to provide an overview here.  
 
The Marketplace of Ideas 
“The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market,” Justice Holmes infamously declared in his Abrams v. United States dissent.143 
The classic image of competing ideas and robust debate is frequently used by scholars 
and judges to explain and justify First Amendment freedoms.144 The marketplace theory 
posits that “truth” will eventually emerge through comparison of competing 
viewpoints.145 However, such a metaphor seems farfetched in the current realities of the 
algorithm era.  
The basic requirement of the marketplace of ideas is similar to that of capitalism. 
It only works if there is perfect competition, uninhibited by interference. However, as 
highlighted above, algorithms often mediate information through search and social 
platforms. The filter bubble effect discussed above and direct manipulation by platforms 
are two ways in which the marketplace is skewed.  
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By deprioritizing challenging material, filtering discourages alternative 
exploration, while at the same time limits other sources and contradictory viewpoints.146 
Filtering may also signal an aura of legitimization and certainty. As algorithms often do 
not take accuracy into account, individuals may be fed information with the illusion of 
creditability creating a web of questionable facticity.147 This has arguably led to the rise 
of conspiracy websites such as infowars.com and beforeitsnews.com, and more recently 
the phenomenon of fake news and clickbait.148 The bubble makes it difficult for “truth” 
to be found, especially if individuals are not aware of its occurrence - which is discussed 
below.   
While intermediaries argue that any case of direct manipulation of information 
would be cured by the increasing personalization of results, as legal scholars Oren 
Bracha and Frank Pasquale eloquently wrote in 2008 “far from solving the problem, 
[personalized search] seems to increase the stakes of manipulation and temptation to 
engage in it. The logic of this prediction is simple. Personalized search targeted at the 
specific characteristics of users makes possible more finely tuned manipulation and 
increases the potential value of each intervention in the search results.”149  
 Machine learning and the data revolution accelerate this concern, especially as 
the shift occurs from search engines that determine what people are looking for to virtual 																																																								
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concierges or assistants that know precisely how to assist people with decisions. This 
shift is already taking place with Amazon’s Echo and Google’s Home at the forefront. 
Wired explained the cycle, “ as [our] butler surfs the web to seamlessly provide more of 
what interests us and less of what doesn’t, we will grow to like and trust it...The more we 
rely on our butler, the more data it collects on us, the more opportunities for the 
algorithms to learn, and the better the butler can predict our needs and identify relevant 
services. The more we use the butler, the more power it will have.”150  
Furthermore, courts have recognized the government’s role in protecting against 
potential private interference before. In Turner Broadcasting the Supreme Court 
observed that the First Amendment “does not disable the government from taking steps 
to ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway 
of communication, the free flow of information and ideas.”151 The Turner ruling 
highlights the responsibility of the government to act when access to information make 
be at stake.  
 
Individual Autonomy and Democracy 
  A litany of legal scholars and political theorists agree that the First 
Amendment’s role is central to the promotion of democracy. For example, as Robert C. 
Post has argued, the media provides citizens the information they need to debate the 
many issues being acted upon by their government and in creating this “public sphere” 
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they “preserve the democratic legitimacy of our government.”152 A necessary 
prerequisite to an informed debate is the ability to use reason and practical judgment 
about the information at hand. 
However, algorithmic mediation often passes individuals by without being 
noticed or understood.153 For example, one recent study found college students were 
“largely unaware” of news prioritization on Facebook and Google, two sites younger 
individuals increasingly rely on for news.154 Insufficient knowledge surrounding 
algorithmic influence creates a self-governance issue. If individuals are unaware how 
algorithms are influencing content, they cannot make critical decisions about what they 
choose to believe.155 As media scholar Diakopoulos highlights, “in the print world, 
partisan media was transparent about its biases, and readers could therefore select which 
bias they preferred. Today, readers don’t necessarily know how algorithms are biased 
and how nuanced the filters they receive content through really are. Newspapers have 
always been able to have an editorial voice and to possibly even affect voting patterns 
based on that editorial voice,” says Diakopoulos. “But what we’re seeing [now] is the 
ability to scale across a population in a much more powerful way.”156 
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 Scholars have also noted that what people miss is the “unknown unknowns,”157 
and the standardization of information. “Recommending a search, standardizing a user’s 
online behaviors, and suggesting a purchase—involves unseen, categorical, 
computational judgments about which searches, articles, or purchases should probably 
come next. Users are not offered limitless options but are, in fact, given a narrowly 
construed set that comes from successfully fitting other people, past actions, and 
inanimate objects into categories—using categories to discipline action. —categorically 
narrowing the set of socially acceptable answers to the question of what ought to be 
done,” writes Mike Ananny.158 
Insufficient knowledge occurs for two main reasons. First, organizations limit the 
details of their algorithms for fear that transparency would undermine their competitive 
advantage, hurt their reputation, or leave the system open to manipulation.159 As such, 
their algorithms and code are protected from disclosure by trade secret laws.160 Second, 
the technical complexity and opacity can hide and obfuscate their inner workings to 
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people not fluent in coding minutiae.161 Such obscureness led one scholar to warn  “what 
we generally lack as a public is clarity about how algorithms exercise power over us.”162  
 The judicial deference to First Amendment defenses is a natural one given the 
historical context of the First Amendment as a barrier to government overreach and 
censorship. Another reason for the lack of theoretical discussion in the current case law 
could be attributed to the desire to avoid an overbroad limiting theory.163 However, 
judges and lawyers are now confronted with a First Amendment whose scope is always 
expanding and that lacks any identifiable justificatory principle, this approach could 
have real consequences as private interests and algorithms continue to hold enormous 
power to shape how individuals interact with information and perceive the world. 		
B. Technology  
The opinions analyzed above show how judges have determined that code, 
algorithmic outputs, and arguably, data, are to be considered “speech.” This current 
approach fails to take into account how these individual elements work together to create 
the digital realm. Cyberspace is an interwoven blanket of computer code and algorithmic 
outputs, which are increasingly autonomous and dependent on massive amounts data. 
However, surely not every digital thing should be considered “speech”?  
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The law as it now stands strongly implies that the First Amendment will be 
implicated any time the government sets out to regulate code.164 The code cases stand for 
a broad criterion for protection: if it is written in a language that someone might use to 
communicate anything, then it must be covered under the First Amendment. However, 
underlying what appears when one opens Facebook, Apple News, or Twitter is code. 
Code is what is used to construct the complex web of algorithms that work behind the 
scenes to index, prioritize, and deliver information.165 
In addition to the code itself, Search King and St. Louis Martin declared that 
algorithmic outputs or decisions would be awarded protection provided that such output 
constitutes an “opinion.” However, can an output function as an opinion if it’s neither 
communicated nor perceived in the first place? Machine learning algorithms evolve and 
change as a result of being exposed to ever-increasing sets of data, thus even further 
obfuscating any “opinion” of its engineer. The more algorithmic outputs become based 
on individual data, the more such outputs seem similar to the uncovered speech in an 
aircraft navigational chart than to the expression protected in cases involving 
newspapers.166  
Furthermore, the question of affording constitutional protections to data and data 
mining becomes even more pressing in light of machine learning. As the line between 
computer and user blurs, it becomes even tougher to disentangle data and speech. 
Subjecting data regulations to strict scrutiny could inadvertently legitimize 																																																								
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discrimination and even chill expression.  Far from being impartial, many studies have 
highlighted the numerous ways in which algorithms produce biased results across a 
number of industries.167168 Even the White House warned about the “potential of 
encoding discrimination in automated decisions” in such areas as credit reporting, 
employment opportunities, education, and criminal justice.169 
Although limited human direction may make a case for the objectivity of the 
algorithmic process, data generation is often a social phenomenon inflected with human 
prejudice.170 This has led some scholars to assert that machine learning algorithms, 
which learn by processing more information, are especially prone to biases from their 
training data or “data diet.”171 In addition, enhanced computation often increases 
processes of sorting and classifying as it becomes easier to implement in every sector of 
our lives, which could accelerate and deepen traditional stereotypes rather than 
reforming them.172 
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 Aggressive data collection may also limit expression online. Many scholars have 
explored how governmental surveillance may chill speech.173 As Justice Brennan states 
in Lopez, “Where such extensive surveillance occurs, or is reasonably feared, the 
potential for limiting speech is clear: ‘There is only one way to guard against 
[eavesdropping], and that is to keep one’s mouth shut on all occasions.’”174 This logic 
can also be applied to the private sector as individuals may limit online activity out of 
concern that it would be tracked and analyzed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
173 See e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY 
DOCTRINE 1 (2014); Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1485-91 (2010); JAMES CARR & PATRICIA BELLIA, LAW OF ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE § 2:58 (2014); Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet 
Search Behavior (Aug. 28, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412564. 	
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	 48	
IV.  A CHANCE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY  
As examined above, there are several reasons to object to blanket protection for 
information intermediaries and their algorithms. In response, appeals for transparency, 
objectivity, and accuracy have intensified. Yet, currently, the law does little to hold 
algorithms or their owners accountable and any regulation would likely spur a face off 
against the First Amendment. It’s easy to assume that if code, algorithmic outputs, and 
the “dissemination and creation of information” are all considered speech, the First 
Amendment will continually be used as a defense unless some limiting theory is put 
forth.  In the meantime, technology has not stood still. The same household name 
Internet companies that brought us search engines and social networks have begun a 
large-scale pivot toward machine learning and artificial intelligence.175  
This section begins by reviewing an array of proposals focused on increasing 
algorithmic responsibility and accountability. It specifically addresses advancements in 
machine learning by underlining that as a society we are shifting to more dependence on 
integrated devices and digital assistants. This section then analyzes different frameworks 
put forth by media law scholars for determining what constitutes protected speech. 
Finally, by drawing on these frameworks this section concludes by offering an updated 
method for clearing the speech hurdle and the First Amendment’s barriers to regulation. 																																																								
175 There is a veritable AI arms race as large companies have moved to invest in different AI projects. In 
January 2014, Google spent $500 million to purchase DeepMind, a company that defines its mission as 
“solving intelligence” by combining “the best techniques from machine learning and systems neuroscience 
to build powerful general-purpose learning algorithms.” Google DeepMind, GOOGLE DEEPMIND, 
http://deepmind.com/index-alt.html#our- mission;  Dan Rowinski, Google’s Game of Moneyball in the 
Age of Artificial Intelligence, READWRITE (Jan. 29, 2014), http://readwrite.com/2014/01/29/google-
artificial-intelligence- robots-cognitive-computing-moneyball.  
Facebook and Microsoft have also invested in similar companies. See, e.g., IBM Watson, IBM, 
http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/ibmwatson/ ; Facebook AI Research (FAIR), FACEBOOK, 
https://research.facebook.com/ai; Introducing Project Ad- am: A New Deep-Learning System, 
MICROSOFT (July 14, 2014), http://research. microsoft.com/apps/video/default.aspx?id=220709&r=1.   	
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A.  Accountability Measures 
A note on what this paper is not: it is not an appeal to eliminate platforms, digital 
assistants, or technology from our lives. In the information age, we all gain when 
algorithms can refer us to webpages, books, and other media relating to our topic of 
interest. Yet, we all stand to lose when increasingly authoritative algorithms and their 
owners do not act responsibly when publishing and disseminating the information they 
gather. Negative impacts can also be exacerbated by a lack of public knowledge. In 
response, many commentators and scholars have suggested responsibility and 
accountability measures. The objectives of which generally fall into three categories: 
transparency, objectivity, and accuracy. Each will be discussed below.  
 
Transparency  
Much has been written about the secret and complex nature of algorithms and 
several have called for increased transparency of algorithmic processes.176 “Self-serving 
and reckless behavior is surprisingly common, and easy to hide in code protected by 
legal and real secrecy,” writes Pasquale.177 Several argue that mandated transparency 
																																																								
176 See e.g., Nicholas Diakopoulos, Algorithmic Accountability, 3:3 DIGITAL JOURNALISM, 398-415 
(2015); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY 
AND INFORMATION (1st ed. 2015); Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, 
Fairness, And Accountability In the Law of Search, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1149 (2008); Jack Balkin, 
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. (2016).  
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policies would incentivize organizations to reduce manipulation of algorithmic outputs, 
lessen discrimination against certain groups, and increase accuracy.178 
Transparency regarding the underlying code of machine learning algorithms may 
be difficult to achieve however. As the behavior of such an algorithm depends in part on 
its post-design experience or “data diet,”179 the resulting code is ever changing and not 
easily discernable or entirely understood by designers and programmers.180 It is this most 
obvious feature, that of autonomy, which separates machine learning from earlier 
technologies.181 Therefore, transparency in terms of what type of algorithm it is 
(machine learning or not), the algorithm’s data diet, and the underlying goals of the 
organization may be more useful in remedying the issues highlighted above.182 
Such transparency could enhance algorithmic literacy and create a more educated 
public capable of understanding that algorithms can lead to inequitable and biased 
outcomes. This does not require that users understand the inner workings of all 
algorithms—this is not feasible. Yet, instilling a healthy dose of informed skepticism 
could be useful enough to reduce blind reliance, thus overcoming some of the individual 
autonomy issues above. This might require platforms to be more forthcoming with how 
their algorithms mediate information. Google has arguably taken steps in the past to 																																																								
178 Supra note 75. One can argue that transparency polices like restaurant inspection scores or automobile 
safety tests have been quite effective for instance.  
 
179 An Intelligence in Our Image: The Risks of Bias and Errors in Artificial Intelligence, Rand Corporation 
(2017), available at www.rand.org/t/RR1744. Terming all of the training data the algorithm’s “data-diet.” 
 
180 See e.g., Matthew Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARVARD JOURNAL OF L. & TECH. (2016). Matthew Scherer argues for 
an Artificial Intelligence Development Act. That would set up an agency. 
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182 Furthermore, requiring transparency in these areas means that companies don’t necessarily have to 
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explain certain search results.183 For example, when a Holocaust-denial site routinely 
appeared in the top ten results for the query “Jew,” Google added a headline to the top of 
the search homepage titled, “an explanation of our search results.” The linked webpage 
explained the reasons why the anti-Semitic site appeared so high in the relevant ranking 
and distanced Google from the result.184 
 
Objectivity  
Although many information intermediaries and platforms portray themselves as 
simple and passive conduits of information, the veracity of this statement lends itself to 
scrutiny when the same organizations seek shelter under the First Amendment for their 																																																								
183 However, if regulation mandated a disclaimer it would most likely be held as unconstitutional 
compelled speech.   In Langdon v. Google, a district court relied on Miami Hearld Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo to find that plaintiff’s insistence that several search engines must carry his adds and “honestly” 
rank his websites would be prohibited compelled speech. See See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 
2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007) 
 
184  Google gave this response: “If you recently used Google to search for the word “Jew,” you may have 
seen results that were very disturbing. We assure you that the views expressed by the sites in your results 
are not in any way endorsed by Google. We’d like to explain why you’re seeing these results when you 
conduct this search.A site’s ranking in Google’s search results is automatically determined by computer 
algorithms using thousands of factors to calculate a page’s relevance to a given query. Sometimes 
subtleties of language cause anomalies to appear that cannot be predicted. A search for “Jew” brings up 
one such unexpected result. If you use Google to search for “Judaism,” “Jewish” or “Jewish people,” the 
results are informative and relevant. So why is a search for “Jew” different? One reason is that the word 
“Jew” is often used in an anti-Semitic context. Jewish organizations are more likely to use the word 
“Jewish” when talking about members of their faith...” “Our search results are generated completely 
objectively and are independent of the beliefs and preferences of those who work at Google. Some people 
concerned about this issue have created online petitions to encourage us to remove particular links or 
otherwise adjust search results. Because of our objective and automated ranking system, Google cannot be 
influenced by these petitions. The only sites we omit are those we are legally compelled to remove or 
those maliciously attempting to manipulate our results.” See the full letter here: Loren Baker, Google 
Explains JewWatch Search Results, SEARCH ENGINE JOURNAL (May 12, 2004) 
https://www.searchenginejournal.com/google-explains-jew-watch-search-results/552/; See also Noam 
Lemelshtrich Latar and David Nordfors, Digital Identities and Journalism Content: How Artificial 
Intelligence and Journalism May Co-Develop and Why Society Should Care, 6 INNOVATION JOURNALISM 
7 (2009) (highlighting algorithms’  role in the rise of behavioral advertising); Google also came under fire 
more recently with Holocaust denial sites. Frank Pasquale, From Holocaust Denial To Hitler Admiration, 
Google’s Algorithm Is Dangerous, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2017) Pasquale writes, “These terrifying 
acts of violence and hate are likely to continue if action isn’t taken. Without a transparent curation process, 
the public has a hard time judging the legitimacy of online sources.” 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/holocaust-google-algorithm_us_587e8628e4b0c147f0bb9893 
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“opinions.”185 As stated above, most individuals attach an aura of objectivity and 
truthfulness to computerized results. However, as also spotlighted above, the 
dissemination of information and even the information itself is increasingly targeted due 
in part to the rise of behavioral advertising.186  With the lack of public clarity in terms of 
how algorithms exercise their power and influence, there have been several appeals for 
regulation requiring that computerized decisions such as search results be unbiased and 
objective,187 free from manipulation,188 and that advertising be clearly marked.189 Some 
have even argued that search engines be regulated as a public utility190, an idea that has 
had much more traction in Europe.191 
Requiring some form objectivity in automated results may grow in importance as 
we move from using browser search functions to becoming more dependent on and 
trusting of digital assistants. The potential harms transcend “the search bias issue,” 
																																																								
185  See discussion of the algorithmic output cases above.  
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writes Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi in Wired,192 especially as the distinction 
between human and device blurs. 
 
Accuracy  
 Proposals for accuracy apply in two contexts; accuracy in terms of the data-diet, 
and accuracy of outgoing information. As the outputs from algorithms become less 
dependent on the judgments of programmers and more responsive to individual users, 
data accuracy and security becomes crucial. Requiring steps to make data collection and 
data use more accurate could diminish discriminatory impacts. However, if every 
regulation of the “creation and dissemination of information”193 must survive First 
Amendment scrutiny, meaningful governance becomes increasingly difficult and 
paradoxically so does meaningful protection of expressive liberty.194 
 In addition, several have noted the rise of misinformation or “fake news.”195 One 
survey even found that the most popular false news stories were more widely shared on 
Facebook than the most popular mainstream news stories.196 Currently, platforms are 
largely immune to any liability for misinformation claims, including defamation, largely 
																																																								
192 Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi supra note 150.  	193	See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011)	
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195 See e.g., Jordan Cook, Facebook will never take responsibility for fake news, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 19, 
2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/19/facebook-will-never-take-responsibility-for-fake-news; Josh 
Halliday, Facebook and Twitter should do more to combat fake news GCHQ say, The Guardian (March 
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on account of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).197 The act provides 
that platforms are not to be treated as “publishers” of the information. Part of the 
rationale behind the CDA was to protect platforms from liability for copyright 
infringement198 and tort claims against statements made by users.199  
However, several have called for more liability for platforms.200 As explained by 
attorney and Stanford law researcher Morgan Weiland, “Facebook's highly personalized 
algorithmic curation of its users' newsfeeds falls in a legal gray area with respect to CDA 
230. As you know, CDA 230 provides immunity for "interactive computer services," 
drawing a line between that category and "information content providers." But it's not 
entirely clear when the former becomes the latter; in other words, it's not clear when an 
intermediary engages in enough editing of third-party content that it becomes an 
"information content provider" and loses CDA 230 immunity.”201  
It is similarly unclear how an algorithmic or robot journalist would be held 
accountable for accuracy claims.202 On the one hand it seems clear that the media 
organizations (if they are considered as such) would still be responsible for whatever 
content its algorithm produces. However, as machine learning becomes more 
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198 Copyright infringement immunity is largely due to the DMCA as well.  
 
199 Supra note 197.  
 
200 Supra note 195.		
201 Annalee Newitz, It’s time to get rid of the Facebook News Feed because it’s not news, ARS TECHNICA 
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sophisticated and autonomous, others have argued that such a system could be viewed as 
a superseding cause for tort liability.203 
Unfortunately, the law as it currently stands appears to actually aid the 
development of partial and irresponsible algorithms. In addition, faced with the prospect 
of legal regulation in any form, organizations will likely claim constitutional protections 
as code, algorithmic outputs, and the “creation and dissemination of information” have 
been considered speech covered under the First Amendment umbrella. This makes any 
imposition of accountability extremely difficult. Fear of technological change and calls 
for government interference is not a new phenomenon.  However, the rise of machine 
learning and AI has so far occurred in a regulatory vacuum behind closed doors, which 
leads back to the question: what poses a greater threat to free speech, the lack of 
regulations, or the regulations themselves? 
 
B. What Is “Speech”? – A Scholarly Analysis  
This paper’s aim is not necessarily to propose any specific regulatory scheme per 
se,204 but rather to call attention to how the First Amendment is consistently used as a 
deregulatory tool. Heightened scrutiny disincentivizes and raises the costs of 
regulation.205 The development over the past two years of new algorithms, 
corresponding digital architectures, and resulting social practices, makes it essential that 																																																								
203 Supra note 175. See also In addition to governmental regulation, there is also a growing self-regulatory 
field focusing on finding technical solutions for assuring algorithmic fairness or certifying and correcting 
disparate impact in machine learning algorithms. See e.g., Osonde Osoba and William Welser IV, An 
Intelligence in Our Image: The Risks of Bias and Errors in Artificial Intelligence, Rand Corporation 
(2017), available at www.rand.org/t/RR1744. 
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205 Stuart Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1445, 1451 (2013). 
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courts reengage the First Amendment to protect its underlying values. So, what is the 
solution? Media law scholars Tim Wu206 and Stuart Benjamin207 have each wrestled with 
this question by analyzing what should qualify as protected speech based on past First 
Amendment jurisprudence and communication theory.  
“Insofar as we are concerned about the expansiveness of First Amendment 
coverage, we may want to limit it in two areas of genuine uncertainty: editorial decisions 
that are neither obvious nor communicated to the reader, and laws that single out 
speakers but do not regulate their speech,” writes Duke University School of Law 
professor Stuart Benjamin.208 In his influential work on the topic of algorithms and 
speech (aptly titled Algorithms and Speech), Benjamin concludes that the benchmark for 
determining what constitutes speech is whether the underlying communication “sends a 
substantive message.”209 Through analyzing Supreme Court jurisprudence Benjamin 
argues that “the touchstone of the Court’s First Amendment cases has always been that 
the underlying activity entails an expression of ideas, even if it is not ‘a narrow, 
succinctly articulable message.’ Communication thus seems to require, at a minimum, a 
speaker who seeks to transmit some substantive message or messages to a listener who 
can recognize that message. Thus, in order to communicate, one must have a message 
that is sendable and receivable and that one actually chooses to send.”210  
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This standard derives from the Supreme Court’s symbolic speech doctrine put 
forth in Spence v. State of Washington211 and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston.212  In Spence, the Court articulates that speech merits First 
Amendment scrutiny if the speaker has “an intent to convey a particularized message” 
and “in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”213  This requirement was arguably limited in 
Hurley when the Court held that the Boston St. Patrick’s Day parade was speech for 
First Amendment purposes.  As the Court stated, “a narrow, succinctly articuable 
message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions 
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded 
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.”214 
 Although Benjamin’s test on its face seems to substantially limit First 
Amendment protection for algorithms, Benjamin finds the opposite. “The First 
Amendment encompasses a great swath of algorithm-based decisions.”215  Even search 
results, according to Benjamin, necessarily “entail a transmission of ideas” in deciding 
what information is indexed and how it is displayed.  
																																																								
211 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974). See also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 
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As Columbia law school professor Tim Wu highlighted, “taken generally, this 
standard is overboard: everything from nonpolitical vandalism through political 
assassination ‘sends a message,’ but not all of that can reasonably be speech.”216 
Furthermore, applying this logic to machine learning algorithms or digital assistants is 
troubling. In fact, such a broad test is similar to the logic applied in the code cases. 
Rather than taking into account any First Amendment values or the social context, it 
seems instead that communication as such is what drives protection.217 
Tim Wu has been critical of Benjamin’s standard and offers a different, 
“functional” approach that focuses on whether the speaker in fact adopts the 
communication as its own.218 Wu argues that a “functionality” doctrine exists in First 
Amendment jurisprudence which finds that  “those who merely carry information” do 
not receive protections, and courts should not afford protections to “communication 
tools” that are “purely functional” in conveying information.219  Such tools include 
navigational charts, court filings, and telephone directories.220 In contrast, “speech 
products” that are viewed as “vessels for the ideas of a speaker, or whose content has 
																																																								
216 Wu supra note 208 at 1529 . Wu uses humor to point out the broad logic: “In any event, even by 
Benjamin’s own standard, the argument that the operation of a search engine “entails transmission of 
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been consciously curated,” should be given protections.221 In a nutshell, “speech 
products” are protected, while “communication tool[s]” are not.222 This functionality 
doctrine, according to Wu, is what will be the dividing line that separates speech and 
communication in increasingly technological situations.223  
In applying the functionality doctrine to digital assistants, Wu highlights how the 
law applies to what he terms “human equivalents.”224 “On the one hand, private advice, 
especially communications in the course of professional services, is treated as a form of 
functional communication and doesn’t usually trigger First Amendment protection.” “On 
the other hand, if a doctor writes a book that happens to be wrong about medical facts, 
his efforts are likely nonetheless to be protected by the First Amendment,”225 Wu writes. 
“We are back, then, to the question...is the output of a concierge program merely 
providing some function?”226Wu offers this rule of thumb in conclusion: “The more [a] 
programmer puts in place his opinion, and tries to influence the user, the more likely 
there will be First Amendment coverage.”55227 
In addition, Wu argues that a necessary boundary to the First Amendment is 
personhood, highlighted by the famous case, Blackie the Talking Cat.228  In that case, the 
																																																								
221 Id at 1498.  
 
222 Id.  
 
223 Wu supra note 208 at 1518. 
 
224 Wu supra note 208 at 1531-1532. 
 
225 Id.  
 
226 Id.  
 
227 Id.			
228  Wu supra note 208 at 1501; see also Miles v. City Council, 710 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1983).  
 
	 60	
cat’s owners asserted that the City’s license demand infringed Blackie’s rights under the 
First Amendment.229 Ruling against Blackie, the court held, “although Blackie arguably 
possess a very unusual ability,230 he cannot be considered a “person” and is therefore not 
protected by the Bill of Rights.”231 “It should be clear that a computer and Blackie are 
similar. Neither is human, and both have been trained to express themselves in a way 
that is informative or entertaining to humans. As such, Blackie is indicative of one way 
that courts treat nonhumans who generate what resembles human speech: not very 
seriously,” Wu states232 In attempting to reconcile the Court’s treatment of corporations 
as “persons,” Wu argues that main difference centers on the “quality of the speech in 
question, and in particular the sense that the expression reflects intelligent choices.”233 In 
short, there is a presumption that the identity of the speaker matters in the speech 
analysis and this should be no different when applied to algorithms.234 
Although Wu’s standards are helpful as a starting point, there are some 
disadvantages to the functionality doctrine when applied to the current information 
ecosystem. First, as data collection of individuals becomes the driving force behind 
algorithmic outputs, the line between “communication tools” and “speech products” 
blurs. For example, is an algorithm functional in nature when it recommends “relevant” 																																																								
229 Miles, 710 F.2d at 1543.  
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information to individuals or is it influencing individuals to stay within their values, 
ideologies, and beliefs? Second, while taking the identity of the speaker into account 
may be an important step in balancing First Amendment values (see emphasis on this 
below) excluding all algorithmic speech may be over-inclusive and harmful. For 
instance, what should courts make of the articles written by increasingly employable 
robot journalists?235  Similar to the courts in the decisions analyzed above, it seems Wu 
is attempting to analogize to traditional speech situations that are outdated in this 
algorithm era. However, both Wu and Benjamin highlight the obvious in their 
approaches: that we can no longer believe in a hands-off Internet-speech utopianism to 
safeguard the Internet as a vital and diverse speech environment.  
 
C.  A Method for Determining First Amendment Protection in the Autonomous 
Algorithm Age  
 
“The speech with which the First Amendment is even slightly concerned is but a 
small subset of the speech that pervades every part of our lives,” writes law professor 
Fredrick Schauer.236 Simply put: the First Amendment should not apply in every 
situation.  Rather, courts should consider a multitude of factors when awarding its 
protections. As the Supreme Court emphasized in 1974, whether something constitutes 
protected speech is highly contextual; it should depend on “the factual context and 																																																								
235 Algorithms have also made scripted movies and written songs. See e.g., Annalee Newitz,  Movie 
written by algorithms turns out to be hilarious and intense, ARS TECHNICA (June 6, 2016) 
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environment in which it was undertaken.”237 However, as highlighted above, instead of 
analyzing how the new information ecosystem works, courts continue to analogize to the 
days of paper.238 For reasons already discussed, this can no longer be the case.  
So, what is the solution? Surely not everything can be considered speech in the 
digital era. Therefore, this thesis proposes a three-step approach for granting First 
Amendment protection in the algorithm era. Courts should begin by establishing whether 
the communication or activity in question was algorithmically created or mediated in 
such a way that limits the programmer’s input or opinion. If the communication in 
question is algorithmically mediated, courts should then apply the Spence/Hurley test to 
determine whether a communicative message exists. Finally, courts should reengage the 
balancing of First Amendment values with a listener-centered focus. This three-step 
approach avoids an unwarranted expansion of the scope of protected activities under the 
First Amendment and prevents the risk of excluding what could become a huge share of 
human communication facilitated by algorithms.  
The first prong necessarily requires courts to establish whether the speaker of the 
communication in question is human or machine. Although companies may attempt to 
argue that all algorithms are the products of human opinion (see the discussion of the 
algorithmic output cases above), this argument is outdated with the current rise of 
autonomous technology that creates or selects content based on relevance or other 
factors attributed to its listener. Here, focus should be paid to the amount of control a 
																																																								
237 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974). 	
238 Although it could be argued that the only reason courts continue to do this is because of the common 
law system in general and the need to recognize precedent. However, this is more of a call for courts to 
think creatively, not necessarily write new doctrine, which could be taken as judicial legislating.  
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programmer has over the algorithm.239 If there is such minimal control that programmers 
cannot reasonably foresee a given result then there is no chance for whatever “opinion” 
of the programmer to be communicated. To determine this factor, courts should look to 
whether autonomy was actually designed into the system.   
Although this first analysis is similar to Wu’s personhood analysis above, it does 
not mean that no protection will be given algorithmically mediated or machine 
communications. Rather, after this first step, courts should analyze whether there are 
communicative qualities and balance the values at stake. By not admonishing such 
communication from protection at first glance makes sure the test is not over exclusive. 
This protects human speakers who use a computer instead of pen paper to express 
opinions.  
Furthermore, by requiring courts to first establish whether a communication is 
algorithmically mediated right off the bat, courts can then start to build a doctrine suited 
for algorithmic communication. Throughout First Amendment jurisprudence one can 
arguably find different categories of “speech” and corresponding doctrine. Such 
categories include, commercial speech,240 symbolic or expressive speech,241 and student 
																																																								
239 Control has become a problem as there have been increasingly events where algorithms have 
“surprised” their engineers. See e.g., Matthew Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, 
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARVARD JOURNAL OF L. & TECH. (2016). Matthew Scherer 
argues for an Artificial Intelligence Development Act. That would set up an agency. 	
240 Content-based regulations of commercial speech only need to withstand intermediate scrutiny. See e.g., 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980).;44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996).  
 
241 Also termed symbolic speech, expressive conduct, or the expression of an idea through activity, see 
e.g., supra O'Brien note   ; Spence supra note 238 ; Johnson supra note; see also Cohen v. California 403 
U.S. 15 (1971) United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).  
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speech.242 Although these categories are not completely mutually exclusive, they do tend 
to highlight different balancing approaches and values.243 This first step could help to 
spur courts to take into account new contexts, instead of trying to fit this new type of 
communication into old molds.  
The second step focuses on the communicative aspect of the message. Part of the 
analysis necessary to determining whether an activity or a type of communication is 
speech is deciding whether it contains any communicative value. This step applies Stuart 
Benjamin’s and the Spence/Hurley approach above; “that communication should require 
at a minimum, a speaker who seeks to transmit some substantive message or messages to 
a listener who can recognize that message.”244 The “speaker” here would arguably be 
more machine than human, but for reasons stated above (over exclusivity being the most 
pertinent) that is acceptable.245   However, emphasis should be placed on the arguably 
forgotten factor of analysis - whether there are enough social conventions in place such 
that others can understand the specific activity as conveying a message.246 This does not 
necessarily mean that listeners would have to discern a particular message, as 
admonished by Hurley, but just that listeners are aware that some message could be 
articulated. 																																																									
242 See e.g., Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 593 (1969); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 
243 One can argue that the values emphasized by the commercial speech cases are slightly different from 
the values emphasized by the student speech cases. This is not to say that one is right and the other is 
wrong. After all, no one theory can explain First Amendment jurisprudence.  
 
244 Stuart supra note 211.  
 
245 Machines can still convey information, and as newsrooms increasingly employ algorithms.  	
246 See Jorge Roig, Decoding First Amendment Coverage of Computer Source Code in the Age of Youtube, 
Facebook, and the Arab Spring, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319 (2002).  		
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 Finally, if some communicative value could be found, the courts should weigh 
the consequences of attributing First Amendment protection on the listener or audience’s 
values. Such a focus on the listener or audience aspect here is warranted as the “speaker” 
in question is arguably nonhuman. Current doctrine recognizes a number of speech 
environments in which listeners' First Amendment interests are paramount in ways that 
justify not only the expression's protection but also its regulation.247 For example, courts 
have long treated commercial speech as occurring in such a listener-centered 
environment.248 Consumers’ interest in receiving truthful and non-misleading 
advertisements thus justifies First Amendment protections for commercial speech while 
leaving government significant power to protect those listeners through content-based 
regulations that include outright bans on false or misleading speech as well as compelled 
disclosures.249  
Furthermore, some commentators argue that emerging communicative 
technologies require a refocus of free speech theory to protect democratic culture. Jack 
Balkin defines democratic culture as “a culture in which individuals have a fair 
opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning making that constitute them as 																																																								
247 See Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. 
L. REV. 5, 9 (1989) (describing the development of "hearer-centered" First Amendment protection in 
"areas that generally lack a traditional dignitary speaker but that boast numerous hearers interested in 
maximizing their capacity to exercise efficient and autonomous choice").  
 
248 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
("The extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value 
to consumers of the information such speech provides."); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976) (emphasizing the value of "the free flow of commercial 
information" to individual consumers and the public more generally); see also Robert Post & Amanda 
Shanor, Adam Smith's First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 170 (2015) ("The constitutional value 
of commercial speech lies in the rights of listeners to receive information so that they might make 
intelligent and informed decisions. Ordinary First Amendment doctrine, by contrast, focuses on the rights 
of speakers, not listeners.").  
 
249 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980). 	
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individuals.” That is, he goes beyond representative democracy justifications for free 
speech. His primary anxiety is that technologies promise wider participation but also 
carry the means of controlling democratic participation in new ways, and he argues for 
attention to the latter in theorizing about First Amendment constraints on regulation of 
digital networks.250 Such balancing could allow for similar algorithmic accountability 
measures and hone in the use of the First Amendment as a deregulatory tool.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
250 See e.g.,	Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. (2016).  	
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CONCLUSION 
We are just now learning about the impacts of algorithms on the information 
ecosystem. Meanwhile, technology has not stood still. Advancements in the areas of 
machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence will have new impacts and 
consequences. However, currently, the law does little to hold algorithms of any sort 
accountable. Courts have long been deferential to First Amendment defenses, 
proclaiming that code, algorithmic outputs, and the “creation and dissemination of 
information” are all protected speech - any regulation of such will be subject to strict 
scrutiny. This begs the question: with the continued expansion of what is considered 
speech, will the First Amendment ironically become its own worst enemy to the values it 
is supposed to protect? This thesis has found the answer to that question to be a 
resounding “yes” and has put forth a new approach to the constitutional inquiry. This 
requires courts to focus on the identity of the speaker and the communicative aspects of 
the activity, while reengaging balancing of First Amendment values. Such an approach 
is neither over-inclusive nor exclusive and is essential if we want to protect the values 
underlying the First Amendment and this nation.  
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